Science, Society, and America’s Nuclear Waste

GRB Consulting Services GRB97-001

Introduction

Technology allows for nuclear power plants to generate 22% of our nations electricity.  The military uses nuclear technology to power their vessels as well as produce weapons.  The medical industry uses nuclear technology to help us better care for the sick.  Industry through out the world uses nuclear technology to produce a better standard of living for the planet.  There certainly are no free handouts, all of the above mentioned entities in turn produce different types of nuclear waste.  These wastes have to be stored and disposed of in ways which safeguard human health and protect the environment.  One of the key questions asked about nuclear power production is whether the industry can manage its waste safely and economically.  Nuclear power, energy and industry differ from other forms of technology currently available, such as, fossil burning fuels, geothermal energy, and solar energy.  Nuclear technology produces a much larger amount of energy from a much smaller amount of fuel.  This means that it gives rise to a much smaller volume of waste.  However, much of this waste is radioactive and, like many other wastes, could be damaging to our health and the environment if not properly managed.  Nuclear waste is a form of by product that very few of us in the public sector know or even understand.  There are methods currently available to us about the treatment and proper disposal of these highly toxic and unstable elements.

Different kinds of radioactive waste have very different levels of radioactivity and therefore require very different management procedures.  A large proportion of all radioactive waste is of similar to or not very much higher radioactivity than the natural background.  A small proportion of the rest is highly radioactive and requires particularly careful management.  Even this highly radioactive waste is not dangerous for ever, because radioactivity decays over time.  This is how the nuclear industry views it, but not necessarily the public, and will always be up for debate.  However, management must allow for long term safety, since some radioisotopes take a very long time to decay.

Radioisotopes are a combination of neutrons and protons produced artificially, which do not already exist in nature, the atom becomes unstable and is called a radioactive isotope or radioisotope.  Radioisotopes can be manufactured in several ways.  The most common is by neutron activation in a nuclear reactor.  This involves the capture of a neutron by the nucleus of an atom resulting in an excess of neutrons or neutron rich.  Radioisotopes can also be manufactured in a cyclotron in which protons are introduced to the nucleus resulting in a deficiency of neutrons or proton rich.  The nucleus of a radioisotope usually becomes stable by emitting an alpha and/or beta particle.  These particles may be accompanied by the emission of energy in the form of electromagnetic radiation known as gamma rays.  This process is known as radioactive decay.  The extent of penetration depends upon several factors including the energy of the radiation, the mass of the particle and the density of the solid.

Nuclear Age Timeline

In 1895 Wilhelm Roentgen discovered x-rays.  While studying the luminescence (light) produced by cathode rays, Roentgen had placed a cathode ray tube in a box in a darkened room (cathode ray tube is a vacuum tube in which a cathode, or negatively charged electrode, sends out a stream of electrons).  Accidentally a sheet of paper coated with a barium compound happened to be near the box.  Roentgen noticed that when the tube was switched on in the closed box, the paper glowed brilliantly.  He concluded that some sort of ray had penetrated the box and caused the paper to glow.  Because he didn't know what they were or where they came from, he called them x-rays (x for unknown).  He also noticed the rays caused photographic plates, even when wrapped in paper, to darken or fog.  This led him to take x-ray photographs of objects such as his hand. The photographs revealed the inner structure of the objects.  The world immediately appreciated the medical potential of x-rays.  X-rays revolutionized medicine because they enabled doctors to see the interior of the body without surgery.  Within five years of the discovery, for example, the British Army began using a mobile x-ray unit to locate bullets and shrapnel in wounded soldiers.

During the early 1900’s several people were instrumental in the forward progress of nuclear energy.  Albert Einstein developed a theory about the relationship of mass and energy, better known as E=mc2, is probably the most famous outcome from Einstein's special theory of relativity.  The formula says energy (E) equals mass (m) times the speed of light (c) squared.  In essence, it means that a small amount of mass can be converted to a phenomenal amount of energy.  If there's a lot of energy available, some energy can be converted to mass and a new particle can be created.  Nuclear reactors, for instance, work because nuclear reactions convert small amounts of mass into large amounts of energy.

Georg von Hevesy in 1911 conceived the idea of using radioactive tracers.  This idea was later applied to, among other things, medical diagnosis.  A radioactive tracer is a minute amount of a radioactive substance that's used to "tag" a chemical as it moves through, for instance, a plant.  The radioactive substance can be traced as it moves through the plant, but it doesn't change the plant.  Von Hevesy first applied radioactive tracers to a biological problem in 1923 when he traced lead absorbed by plants.  In 1935, von Hevesy began using artificial radioisotopes as tracers.  Radioactive tracers have been used for many purposes.  For instance, doctors use minute amounts of radioactive substances to diagnose the presence of tumors, ulcers, or non-functioning organs.  Biologists use tracers to follow the path of nutrients through the food chain.  Earth scientists use tracers to follow the path of rainwater as it moves through the groundwater to lakes, rivers, and reservoirs.

It wasn’t until 1938 that two German scientists, Otto Hahn and Fritz Strassman, demonstrated nuclear fission.  They found they could split the nucleus of a uranium atom by bombarding it with neutrons, the uncharged part of atoms.  As the uranium nucleus split, some of its mass was converted to energy.  Other physicists noticed the fission of one uranium atom gave off extra neutrons which could in turn split other uranium atoms, starting a chain reaction.  Roosevelt approved uranium research in the United States in October 1939.  This was the first decision among many that led to establishment of the Manhattan Project.  The Manhattan Project was formed to secretly build the atomic bomb before the Germans.  The Manhattan District of the Army Corps of Engineers built production facilities and towns for workers and scientists in Tennessee, Washington, New Mexico and funded research in university laboratories from Columbia, New York, to Berkeley, California.  Secrecy was so complete that the hundreds of thousands of employees didn't know what they were working on until they heard about the bombing of Hiroshima, Japan on August 6, 1945.  On August 12, 1945, President Truman released the Smyth Report to the American public.  The report contained information on the Manhattan Project, without revealing any atomic secrets.  The American public was astounded to learn of a top-secret operation with the payroll, facilities, and labor force comparable in size to the American automobile industry.

Enrico Fermi demonstrated the first nuclear chain reaction in a lab under the squash court at the University of Chicago.  Fermi and his associates built a crude nuclear reactor, which they called Chicago Pile 1, with 57 alternating layers of uranium and graphite.  Fermi and his team finished the construction of Chicago Pile 1 on the morning of December 2, 1942.  Just three years later the world saw what power and fury this new technology could unleash.  This was demonstrated with the dropping of  two atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki Japan.

On December 20, 1951, the first usable electricity from nuclear energy was produced at the National Reactor Testing Station, later called the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL), in Idaho Falls, Idaho.  The electricity lit four light bulbs strung across a railing in the turbine room of the Experimental Breeder Reactor I (EBR-I).  The first reactor project approved by the Atomic Energy Commission, EBR-I was the brainchild of Walter Zinn, head of Argonne National Laboratory.  In 1953, EBR-I scientists showed a reactor could create more fuel than it used; that is, the reactor could "breed" fuel as it created electricity.  EBR-I operated as a research reactor until 1963, when EBR-II took over (EBR-II is now a historical monument).

On December 8, 1953, in his Atoms for Peace speech to the United Nations, President Eisenhower proposed joint international cooperation to develop peaceful applications of nuclear energy.  He pledged the United States' determination "to help solve the fearful atomic dilemma to devote its entire heart and mind to find the way by which the miraculous inventiveness of man shall not be dedicated to his death, but consecrated to his life."  He suggested that all nuclear nations turn over weapons-grade uranium and other materials to a proposed International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).  It could then share the materials with other nations for use in agriculture, medicine, electrical energy, and other peaceful uses.  When the IAEA finally was formed in 1957, the Atomic Energy Commission offered 5,000 kg (11000 lbs) of uranium to the IAEA.  Two months after his speech, President Eisenhower proposed an amendment to the Atomic Energy Act to permit the international cooperation he spoke of and to allow electric utilities to develop nuclear power plants.

On July 17, 1955, Arco, Idaho became the first U.S. town to be powered by nuclear energy.  The demonstration lasted for one hour in the 1,350-person community.  The National Reactor Testing Station, now called the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, supplied the power from its Borax-III reactor.  It was part of the Atomic Energy Commission's (AEC) Five Year Reactor Development Program in the mid-1950's.  The AEC tested five types of experimental reactors.  The Borax-III was an early prototype of a boiling water reactor, a type of reactor which still produces electricity for utilities today.  Then On October 8, 1957, radiation was released when the graphite core of the Windscale Nuclear Reactor in England caught fire.  A physicist operating Number 1 Pile accidentally let the core temperature rise to a point where the fuel began to melt.  Forty-two hours later, instruments showed that radiation was being released.  The reactor core was on fire.  The fire was put out by flooding the reactor with water and sealing it off. The fire released a large amount of radioactive iodine and polonium, with half-lives of 8.05 days and 138.4 days respectively, into the atmosphere (half-life is the time it takes a radioactive substance to lose half of its radioactivity.). Approximately 528,000 gallons of milk from farms within 200 miles of Windscale were destroyed.  The extent of the radiation's effect on residents is still not fully known.  A 1983 study by the Radiological Protection Board of Great Britain concluded two hundred and sixty cases of thyroid cancer were attributable to the release of radioactive iodine. Other forms of cancer, such as leukemia, have also been reported in the vicinity.

The large number of utility orders for nuclear power reactors made nuclear power a commercial reality in the United States.  Before 1966, electric utilities had ordered less than ten reactors total. In 1966-67, that number quadrupled.  After declining slightly in 1969, nuclear power reactor orders peaked in 1972-73. The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) calling for halting the international spread of nuclear weapons capabilities was signed.  Non-nuclear nations those that had not developed nuclear weapons at the time they signed the NPT pledged never to make or acquire nuclear weapons.  Nuclear nations pledged not to assist other countries in making or acquiring nuclear weapons and to curb the growth of their own arsenals. By 1970, more than 50 countries had ratified the NPT. By 1986, more than 130 countries had ratified it.

The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969 was signed requiring the Federal government in all major actions to examine the environmental consequences of any major Federal action such as the construction of a building to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS), and to conduct a decision-making process that incorporates public input.  An EIS must include the proposed action's purpose, need, alternative, effects on the environment, consequences, and organizations involved in the action.  The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) was formed on December 2, 1970.  The EPA consolidated a number of environmental activities from many federal agencies into one agency.  For the first time, one agency was responsible for setting standards and enforcing pollution control.  Computed Axial Tomography, commonly known as CAT scanning, was introduced.  During a CAT scan, a large coil of x-ray tubes rotates around the patient's body, taking x-rays from all angles.  A computer integrates all of these x-rays into a single, three-dimensional image on a television screen.  The data can be saved on the computer.  A British engineer, Godfrey Hounsfield, and an American physicist, Allan Cormack, developed the CAT scan in the late 1960's and early 1970's.

The Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 abolished the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and created the Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA) and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).  ERDA took over the AEC's research, development, waste management, and cleanup programs.  The NRC became responsible for regulating the commercial nuclear industry.  ERDA later became the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE).  The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) was passed to protect human health and the environment from the potential hazards of waste disposal.  By the 1970s, the United States was generating 200 million metric tons of hazardous waste a year. Up to 90% of these wastes were probably disposed of improperly. Enacted in 1976, RCRA regulates hazardous waste from "the cradle to the grave."  That is, it regulates how hazardous waste is generated, transported, stored, treated and disposed of.  The EPA is responsible for enforcing RCRA.  EPA can delegate hazardous waste management to states with waste management programs at least as stringent as the EPA program.  RCRA was amended in 1984 to prohibit hazardous waste from being disposed of on land unless the hazardous components "won't migrate from the disposal unit as long as the waste remains hazardous" or the waste is pretreated to EPA standards.  On March 28, 1979, one of the two nuclear reactors at Three Mile Island Nuclear Power plant located on an island in the Shenandoah River near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania suffered a partial core meltdown.  On that morning, several water-coolant pumps failed on the second reactor (TMI-2). The reactor shut itself down eight seconds later, but the core temperature continued to rise because valves controlling the emergency cooling water were stuck closed.  The core was eventually flooded and brought under control.  Minimal radioactive material was released.  Because of uncertainty of how much radiation had been, or would be released, the Pennsylvania Governor ordered pregnant women and children within five miles of Three Mile Island evacuated as a precaution.  Although TMI-2's containment held, the reactor was heavily contaminated.  No one could enter the plant for two years.  The TMI-2 reactor was entombed in concrete.  TMI-1 was restarted in 1986.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 was signed, authorizing the development of a spent fuel and high-level nuclear waste repository.  High-level waste is the highly radioactive material that results from reprocessing spent, or used, nuclear fuel. High-level waste includes both liquid and solid waste and contains elements that decay very slowly and remain radioactive for thousands of years.  Most high-level waste must be handled by remote control.  A repository would permanently isolate the waste deep within the Earth. The geology of the repository would have to prevent any possible migration of the waste.  This Act gave DOE the responsibility to locate, license, construct, and operate a geological repository for high-level waste.  In 1987, DOE announced it had designated Yucca Mountain in Nevada as the single site to be considered.

Classification of Nuclear Waste

Spent nuclear fuel is fuel that has been used and then withdrawn from a nuclear reactor.  All spent nuclear fuel from commercial nuclear power plants will be disposed of in a geologic repository for high level waste.  The U.S. does not reprocess commercial spent fuel.  The spent fuel rods will be sealed in special metal canisters for disposal.  In addition to commercial spent fuel, there is Department of Energy (DOE) owned spent fuel and high level waste, Navy reactor spent fuel, and high level waste that results from non DOE research reactors.  Ultimately, all of this spent fuel and high level waste is destined for geologic disposal.

High level nuclear waste is generated by the chemical reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel to recover uranium and/or plutonium.  All high level nuclear waste will be disposed of in a geologic repository.  The waste, in liquid form after reprocessing, will be solidified into a glass or ceramic form (vitrified) and will be sealed in metal canisters for permanent disposal.  In 1985, President Reagan made the decision that separate repositories for the disposal of defense high level waste, commercial spent fuel and high level waste were not necessary.

All radioactive waste other than spent fuel, high level waste, and transuranic waste is considered to be low level waste.  This waste is generated mainly by hospitals, industrial and agricultural facilities, as well as academic institutions.  These wastes will be managed by the individual States that produce the particular low level waste.  This type of waste will be disposed of in facilities developed by individual States as above ground facilities and shallow land burial.

Transuranic waste is physically similar to low level waste but is contaminated with transuranic elements to a level requiring geologic disposal.  Although the total activity of transuranic wastes are no greater than certain low level waste, geologic disposal is considered necessary because they lose radioactivity very slowly and remain hazardous for thousand of years.  Transuranic waste result primarily from defense activities.  Some of this waste is being stored in surface facilities but current plans call for most of this waste generated in the future to be ultimately placed in deep geologic storage at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) facility in New Mexico.  This waste will be in the form of solids sealed in metal canisters.

Mill tailings are naturally radioactive rock and soil that are byproducts of mining and milling uranium.  They are generally disposed of where they are generated, at facilities where uranium ore is mined and milled.  The Federal Government has responsibility for mill tailings at inactive milling facilities.  Companies currently milling uranium must make sure their disposed tailings are in compliance with government and State regulations.

The decay life of radioactivity determines how long it has to be managed.  The concentration of the radionuclides and whether it is heat generating dictates how it should be handled, how much, if any, shielding is needed and determine what ways of disposal are suitable.

Radionuclides are materials which produce ionizing radiation, such as X-rays, gamma rays, alpha particles and beta particles.  These wastes are produced primarily from reprocessing spent fuel and from the use of plutonium in the fabrication of nuclear weapons.  Transuranic (TRU) waste contains materials that are contaminated with radioactive elements heavier than uranium.

Ions are atoms with an electrical charge.  This charge comes from either losing or gaining electrons.  If the atom has lost electrons, it will be desperate to get more, and if it has extra electrons it will be desperate to lose them, as atoms like to be electrically neutral.  This means that ions will react with most things, possibly damaging them.

The main categories of waste from the nuclear fuel cycle are:

Residues left from processing uranium ore contain naturally occurring radioactive elements mined with the uranium, chemicals used in the separation process, create radioactivity that is low level but long-lived.

Materials and equipment (protective clothing, cleaning materials, ion-exchange resins) which become contaminated during the operation of nuclear facilities, radioactivity is mainly low level and short-lived.

The waste arising from nuclear fuel after it has been used in a reactor.  These can be the used fuel itself if it’s not reprocessed or the wastes resulting from reprocessing the used fuel so that it can be recycled. Used fuel that is not to be reprocessed can be regarded as high level, long-lived waste.  Reprocessing wastes are a mixture of high, intermediate and low level wastes, including long-lived intermediate level wastes, the mixture depends on the treatment techniques used.

The wastes resulting from dismantling nuclear reactors after the fuel has been removed and from fuel processing plants at the end of their operating lives.  The radioactivity is low and intermediate level and mainly relatively short-lived.  There will be some long-lived waste from dismantling reprocessing plants.

Additional civilian radioactive wastes arise from medicine, industry and research.  Civilian waste in some instances may contain long lived radionuclides.  We need to keep in mind that the volume of all waste from use of nuclear power is small in comparison to that from other forms of thermal generation.  As we stated earlier nuclear power produces very much more energy from a given amount of fuel.  A pellet of nuclear fuel less than a centimeter in diameter and one and a half centimeters long has about as much energy available as over 450 m3 of natural gas or one ton of coal, and a 1300 MW coal fired power plant would use over 50,000 times the tonnage of fuel, it would need, if it were nuclear powered.

All countries manage the different kinds of waste to take full account of their characteristics, but the classifications they use for the waste differ somewhat according to the systems they use.  Since this may be causing some confusion to the public, standardized international waste classifications could be helpful in explaining what is being done and why it is consistent between countries in achieving the same goals.  It is helpful that a Collective Opinion on the methodology and means for assessing the safety of radioactive waste disposal practices and concepts has been arrived at and published by the Radioactive Waste Management Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Nuclear Energy Agency (OECD/NEA) and the International Radioactive Waste Management Advisory Committee of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), with the endorsement of the experts for the Community Plan of Action in the Field of Radioactive Waste Management of the Commission of the European Communities (CEC).  Safety assessment methods are available today to evaluate adequately the potential long-term radiological impacts of a carefully designed radioactive waste disposal system on humans and the environment, and considered that appropriate use of safety assessment methods, coupled with sufficient information from proposed disposal sites, can provide the technical basis to decide whether specific disposal systems would offer to society a satisfactory level of safety for both current and future generations.

Ionizing radiation can have a significant effect on biological processes, it can therefore damage living organisms.  Regulations on radiation exposures limit the amount of radiation that can be received by workers in the industry and the general public in any one year and in a lifetime.  These values can be found in the Maximum Permissible Exposure Standards.

Radiation is said to be ionizing if it has sufficient energy to displace one or more of the electrons that are part of an atom.  This creates an electrically charged atom known as an ion.  Common examples of ionizing radiation are x-rays and gamma rays, which are emitted by radioactive materials.  Others include beta rays, which are also emitted from radioactive materials, and neutrons, which are emitted during the splitting (fission) of atoms in a nuclear reactor.

There is a misconception that radioactive waste can be a major problem for a million years.  After that time, the only radioactivity left will be from the long-lived isotopes such as the actinides and from the shorter-lived products of their breakdown.

Actinides can be used as part of the fuel mixing process in existing types of nuclear reactors.  Using some actinides can produce fission energy on an industrial scale.  Using actinides, in recycled uranium (uranium, constitutes about 96% of the fuel unloaded from commercial power reactors), and plutonium as nuclear fuel it is possible to reduce the consumption of uranium ore and reduce the long-time hazard of high-level radioactive waste.  Actinides basically allow the re-processing of spent nuclear fuel, and in return give back a lower level of radioactive substance that can be better stored and handled.  Both effects are in line with modern environmental protection goals.

Nuclear Education

Carbon-14 is a radioactive element that is always present in the environment.  In its natural form, it is created when cosmic rays collide with nitrogen atoms in the upper atmosphere.  Some of it is eventually absorbed by the living tissues of animals and plants.  When wood is burned, for instance, a certain amount of carbon that had been absorbed by trees during their lifetimes is released back into the air.  Carbon-14 is also a by-product of a nuclear reaction, and is associated with the used, or “spent,” nuclear fuel generated by this process.  It radiates only low- energy beta particles (electrons).  Large quantities of carbon-14 can be harmful if ingested, the gaseous form of carbon-14 is not dangerous if inhaled in the small concentrations that exist in the atmosphere.  Congress recently asked the EPA to consider the standards by which it might regulate possible carbon-14 and other radioactive emissions from a potential high-level nuclear waste geologic repository.  The National Academy of Sciences has recommended that the EPA set the acceptable health effects of such emissions by considering individuals who might be exposed to specific doses.  Currently, EPA looks at the overall, statistical effect of emissions on the world population.  EPA has convened a committee to address these issues.

Once a year, approximately one-third of the nuclear fuel inside a reactor is removed and replaced with fresh fuel.  The used fuel is called spent fuel.  It is highly radioactive and is the primary form of high-level nuclear waste.  It must be isolated carefully in a repository for thousands of years because, if not properly isolated, its radioactivity can harm people and the environment.  When spent fuel is removed from a reactor, it is put into a pool of water at the reactor site.  The water is a radiation shield and coolant.  Storing the spent fuel in pools is intended only as a temporary measure until a permanent disposal place is found.  As an alternative to storing in pools, some spent fuel is being stored aboveground at reactor sites in concrete or steel containers called dry casks.  Like storage under water in pools, this approach also is intended as temporary.  While pool storage is effective for short-term storage, the need to find safe, permanent disposal is becoming more and more critical because at some nuclear power plants, the storage pools are almost full.

A key element of permanent disposal is that it must be able to isolate high-level radioactive waste for thousands of years because its radioactivity can harm people and the environment.  According to U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) standards, a repository may pose no greater risk than unmined uranium from which the high-level waste was produced.  The Department of Energy (DOE) must prove that a repository will be safe for 10,000 years.  After 10,000 years of radioactive decay, according to EPA standards, the spent fuel and high-level waste no longer pose a threat to public health and safety.  In pools and dry casks today, more than 20,000 metric tons of spent fuel is stored at more than 60 nuclear power plants across the country.  By the year 2000, an estimated 40,000 metric tons of spent fuel will have been produced.  By then, there also will be about 8,000 metric tons of solidified waste from defense programs.  Currently, high-level defense waste is stored at Department of Energy facilities in the states of Idaho, South Carolina, and Washington.

The chemical process by which uranium and plutonium are recovered from spent fuel is called reprocessing.  Several countries with nuclear power reprocess their spent fuel.  Although the United States reprocesses defense nuclear fuel, private industry in the United States is not reprocessing fuel now because it costs more than mining and making new fuel.  Radioactive waste has two basic options, direct disposal and reprocessing.  These give rise to different radioactive residues.  Used fuel for direct disposal is long-lived high level solid waste.  The whole fuel assembly is treated as waste.  It is stored and cooled until its radioactivity and heat output have reduced enough to simplify handling, before it is ready for packaging and final disposal.  These storage and conditioning operations generate intermediate and low level waste.  Before reprocessing, the used fuel is stored for five to ten years at reactor sites or reprocessing plants.  During reprocessing, elements are separated.

The following intermediate and high level wastes will be generated during the different processes:
 

liquid, high level, long-lived waste, mainly fission products and actinides other than uranium and plutonium

liquid, intermediate long-lived waste from various separation processes

liquid, high level waste is stored in cooled tanks for a number of years before being solidified by a vitrification process, steel containers holding vitrified waste are then stored, in air-cooled vaults for the decay heat to reduce, concepts for its final geological disposal have been developed, and its safety has been evaluated

low and intermediate level liquid waste, effluents other than high level waste are sent to a waste treatment plant where they are stored in different tanks, depending on their nature

Nuclear Power & Waste “The Truth”

Energy intensity (energy per unit of GDP) in OECD countries has fallen by 25% since 1971, while electricity intensity has increased by 10%.  Between 1973 and 1990, the proportion of energy consumed as electricity in OECD countries grew from 12% to 18%; electricity use grew on average by 3.1% per year while coal and oil use fell.  Carbon Dioxide (CO2) is responsible for about half of any global warming caused by the greenhouse effect.  About 20 000 million tons of CO2 are emitted annually from the burning of fossil fuels; of this, one-third is due to electricity produced from fossil fuels.  If present nuclear capacity was replaced by coal, an extra 1800 million tons of CO2 would be produced annually,  increasing the emissions due to electricity by 28%.  To stabilize the CO2 concentration in the atmosphere at present levels a 50 to 80% reduction in all emissions would be required, according to the United Nations' Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.  France's carbon dioxide emissions from electricity generation fell by 80% between 1980 and 1987, as its nuclear capacity increased; Germany's nuclear power program has saved the emission of over 2 billion tons of CO2 from fossil fuels since it began in 1961.

When concern about the greenhouse effect began to increase in the late 1980s, it soon became an increasingly important factor in public debate about different sources of electricity.  The case of nuclear power seemed clear cut it did not emit any greenhouse gases, in contrast with fossil fuels.  Of course, some nuclear industry opponents began to put forward the view that carbon dioxide emissions attributable to stages in the nuclear fuel cycle were significant, and could even be comparable in magnitude to those from fossil fuel burning.  Although this appeared to be not proven, it was adopted and repeated by other anti-nuclear groups in several countries.  Studies of the carbon dioxide emissions from the nuclear fuel cycle under the different circumstances show that these emissions are in the region of 0.5% to 4% of the emissions from the equivalent coal fired generating capacity.  Accusations that nuclear power could indirectly produce significant quantities of CO2 depend on a highly improbable scenario.  On the question of methane from uranium mining, the information available indicates that the vast majority of uranium is produced with little or no associated methane.  In isolated instances, methane may be associated with uranium mining and uranium bearing ores. But considering that world production of uranium involves the annual extraction of rather less than 10 million tons of ore, compared with annual coal production of around 4500 million tons, it would seem that methane production from uranium mining can be accurately described as negligible.

The nuclear industry and the scientific community have led the way in pursuing reprocessing/ recycling as a resource management strategy for plutonium and uranium, increasing long-term energy availability and reducing volume and toxicity of final waste.  World nuclear power reactors now produce 50 tons of plutonium annually; recycling this would produce electricity equal to 100 million tons oil equivalent. It seems surprising that “environmentalists”, who support all other recycling schemes, oppose it in the nuclear industry.

Reasons for the existence of a skeptical and untrusting public are due to the fact that the nuclear industry was invented by secret goals of the military defense strategy for nuclear deterrent, partly true, and the accusation of secrecy, though no longer are justified, persists and often focuses upon the waste issue. Secondly, sites for repositories for intermediate and high level waste have not been determined, although the technical competence to construct them exists.  Until repositories are established and operating, the waste problem will not have been solved.  As always politics is involved when it comes to such a large task of managing waste around the world.  Political delays in establishing a national radioactive waste repository have led to the conception that there must be some technical reason for the delay.  The fact that safe storage methods have been developed (either vitrification of high level waste or encapsulated storage of intermediate level waste) has encouraged procrastination.  Finally the anti-nuclear groups, often with media encouragement create arguments on the grounds of health, safety and the environment.

Ways of communicating the positive messages that nuclear waste management systems are fully developed, that high level waste can be reduced in volume by reprocessing the fuel and vitrifying the waste, and that the technical capacity exists to build safe repositories, are then put forward.  Public relations tools such as brochures, videos and exhibitions have their place but are insufficient.  Giving more information convinces people that you are open, but not necessarily that you are honest.  Advertising is of some benefit locally but less nationally, and all these public relations exercises are subject to overnight reversals by over sensationalized stories that the media refuses to utilized their proper journalism techniques in order to educate the public.

The real solution lies in helping the public to expand the concept that to be human means to generate waste, and that waste is not a problem, it is simply being human.  It cannot be prevented, and therefore it must be managed, and this is possible.  Also, the public must be able to make the same cost/benefit analysis about nuclear waste as they make about other waste generating activities, such as use of coal, oil and automobiles, whose pollution they appear prepared to tolerate as the price of the living standards they enjoy.

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act

By exploring the issues of nuclear waste in this broader perspective, we will begin to appreciate the complex social and technical challenges faced by the nation.  Apprehensions regarding nuclear waste technology may surface during these discussions on risk and probabilities.  It is important to probe for, acknowledge, and address these concerns as they are introduced.  Many solutions have been explored over a 30 year period.  Today, the majority of informed technical opinion holds that disposal in deep geologic repositories is the preferred method of permanent isolation.  The U.S. Congress has established that the management of nuclear waste is the responsibility of the present generation and should not be left for future generations.  Despite the controversy associated with the managing of our nation’s nuclear waste, it is imperative that this growing national challenge be addressed promptly and responsibly.

High on the list of concerns shared by many Americans are environmental issues, protecting the parts of the environment that are unspoiled, and preventing unnecessary disturbances in the future.  More and more, decisions that affect the long term well being of society and the environment involve the use of science and technology.  The wise use of technology is one of the best tools Americans have to safeguard the environment.  The safe disposal of nuclear waste is a good example.  Making informed decisions about how to manage the disposal of nuclear waste requires us to have some understanding of the science involved, and also to consider how decisions about waste management will affect people and the environment.

The Act was signed into law by President Reagan in January 1983.  In December 1987, Congress amended it by passing the Nuclear Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1987.  These laws set forth the national policy for safely storing, transporting, and disposing of spent nuclear fuel and other high level radioactive waste.  They made the DOE responsible for carrying out the requirements of the law and created the Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management within DOE to do the job.  DOE must develop, manage and operate a waste system to protect the public health and the environment.  DOE must site, construct, and operate a deep, mined geologic repository.

The United States began studies for isolation high level nuclear waste in 1957 when the National Academy of Sciences first recommended deep geologic disposal.  Study of thick deposits of salt as possible repository site started in the 1096’s.  During the 1970’s, scientific research began in basalt and welded tuff (type of volcanic rock) on lands owned by the Federal Government.  In the late 1970’s, scientists also began to investigate granite and similar type of rock.  In February 1983, as required by law, the DOE named nine potentially acceptable sites for a permanent geologic repository, they are as follows:
 

The law also required DOE to issue guidelines that explain how any site will be evaluated to determine whether it is suitable for a repository and identify specific factors that would disqualify a site.  In December 1984, DOE issued guidelines that required consultation, and review from the public, States and Federal agencies.  The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) agreed to the guidelines, and worked with local and federal agencies to ensure proper implementation of how the DOE was going to properly dispose of the nuclear waste.  The NRC must grant a license before any construction can begin on a repository.

In 1986, following environmental assessment of all nine sites the search was narrowed down to three.  The three sites were recommended to the President for very detailed studies.  Following approval, these studies, referred to as Site Characterization, began at Yucca Mountain, Nevada;  Deaf Smith County, Texas;  and Hanford Washington.  Congress became concerned with delays and rising costs of this program and in late 1987, amended the law, directing DOE to focus site characterization efforts only on Yucca Mountain, Nevada.

Yucca Mountain Site

The following questions have to be asked:
 

In addition to studies related to Yucca Mountain's geologic and environmental suitability, a variety of social, transportation and economic questions about a repository's effect on the quality of life in nearby communities will be researched.  Studying the movement of water, geohydrology, studies will focus on how water moves through Yucca Mountain and how water could affect a repository.  This is important because scientists believe that groundwater is the most likely way radioactive materials could be released from a repository.  Yucca Mountain is in the southern part of the Great Basin where there is very little rainfall, most of which runs off the surface quickly or evaporates. Approximately 15 centimeters of rain falls on Yucca Mountain in a year.  Scientists think that only an extremely small fraction of that rain could soak into the ground and actually reach the underground area where the potential repository would be located.  Additionally, the water table under Yucca Mountain is extremely deep.  This makes it possible to put a repository about 300 m underground and have it be about 240 m above the water table.  Geologists call the rocks and soil above the water table the unsaturated zone.  In the unsaturated zone there is relatively little water in the rock and may move very slowly.  These factors significantly limit the chance of water reaching and corroding waste containers and carrying radioactive material away from a repository.

Earthquakes occur when rocks move along a fault.  Project scientists have been studying faults and monitoring earthquakes in the region surrounding Yucca Mountain for more than 10 years.  These studies will continue during site characterization and probably for years beyond that period, if the site is suitable.  Seismic studies planned for Yucca Mountain will provide information about the potential for movement along faults.  These will be done to understand whether or not fault movement or earthquakes could affect the suitability of the site. As part of these studies there are major trenching programs at Yucca Mountain to study movement of faults during the past two million years.  These studies will show the history of movements of faults, how frequently the faults moved and how much they moved during each episode will also be obtained.  Experience with earthquakes throughout the world has shown that, generally, underground structures can withstand ground motion generated by earthquakes. Tests involving nuclear explosions underground at the Nevada Test Site have shown that underground structures can withstand ground motion greater than that anticipated from earthquakes. Safety engineering design of surface facilities would consider the possible effects of an earthquake, and buildings would be designed and built to withstand any anticipated effects.  At this time, assessments suggest that risk of damage to surface and underground facilities from faults is low because the amount of movement along faults in that area appears to be small. Additionally, there possibly are thousands of years between movements.  Scientists are confident that such faulting could never break open the mountain to expose waste at the surface.  Geologic dating of surface material around Yucca Mountain indicates that the mountain itself and the terrain around it have remained largely unchanged over the last one million years.  Current information strongly indicates that Yucca Mountain would remain stable over the period of time required by the regulations.

Yucca Mountain was formed millions of years ago by a series of explosive volcanic eruptions that deposited ash and material which compressed together to create layers of rock called tuff. The explosive type of volcano that formed Yucca Mountain is extinct.  There are, however, seven small and dormant volcanoes scientists are studying in the Yucca Mountain area to determine if one might erupt in the next 10,000 years and if an eruption might affect an underground nuclear waste repository.  By studying the layers of soil and rock to learn about past volcanic activities, scientists can make predictions about the future.  Volcanologists have been studying volcanoes at Yucca Mountain for more than a decade.  Scientists believe that the probability of a volcano erupting in the Yucca Mountain region over the next 10,000 years is very remote and does not make the site unsuitable for a repository.  The chance of a volcano directly affecting a repository in the Yucca Mountain area has been calculated as about 1 in 500 million per year.  The seven volcanoes located near Yucca Mountain are among the most common type of volcano on earth.  Two cones are located about 19 to 43 km away, and may have been active within the last 10,000 years.  The other five, located 13 to 43 km away, had their last eruptions from 300,000 years to 1.2 million years ago.

There are three main types of volcanoes.  Composite volcanoes have explosive eruptions, such as Mt. St. Helens in Washington. The eruptions that formed Yucca Mountain itself were from a composite volcano.  Shield volcanoes have less explosive eruptions, and people can walk fairly close to some slow-moving lava from these volcanoes.  The Hawaiian islands are examples of shield volcanoes.  Out of the three main types of volcanoes, cinder cones generally are the smallest volcanoes with the simplest and weakest eruptions. The seven dormant volcanoes near Yucca Mountain are cinder cones.  A magma chamber is an underground pocket of rock and earth so hot it has melted to a liquid or paste. Data gathered so far suggests that there is no evidence of a magma chamber beneath the volcanoes near Yucca Mountain.  That makes the likelihood of a new volcano in the region extremely remote.  More studies will be conducted to get additional data about volcanism in that area.

Various methods will be used to get information, which include:
 

This wide array of studies will provide a credible basis for scientific decisions about the suitability of the site.  It should be emphasized that if, at any time, these studies show that Yucca Mountain does not qualify as a repository site, DOE must stop work and report to Congress.

Government

When studies are complete and if the data indicate that Yucca Mountain could isolate waste safely, DOE will seek presidential approval to apply to the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) for a license to construct a repository.  The NRC then would determine whether the proposed site meets strict federal health and safety regulations.  The geologic, hydrologic and related technical studies at Yucca Mountain are directed by DOE's Yucca Mountain Site Characterization Project.  The studies are outlined in a Site Characterization Plan (SCP) published in December 1988.  Issues to be studied include whether the geology of Yucca Mountain is capable of isolating high-level radioactive waste, whether earthquakes or volcanic activity pose a threat to a repository, whether potentially valuable natural resources exist at the site and whether rainfall in the region or changes in the water table might affect how well a repository would isolate waste.

Surface and underground studies will be initially reported to the public.  Field work will focus on studies conducted at the surface of Yucca Mountain, such as bore hole drilling and trenching.  An underground exploratory facility and tunnels will be mined to study in detail the geology and hydrology at Yucca Mountain.  The underground laboratory will be excavated at the potential repository depth, approximately 300 m, so scientists can have direct access to the rock to conduct experiments that simulate an actual waste facility.  The results of these studies will be discussed in regular progress reports issued to the public.  Several such progress reports have been issued to date.

The study of effects on communities and the environment also need to be analyzed, deciphered and reported.  In addition to the actual site characterization work, environmental, socioeconomic and transportation studies will forecast potential project impacts on the region surrounding the Yucca Mountain site and develop steps to limit such impacts as much as possible.  The following information will allow the reader to get a better understanding of what is necessary for the various reports and potential information that would become necessary to properly evaluate an actual site characterization plan.

Socioeconomic
 

Environmental
 

Transportation
 

Information from these studies will be included in an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) to be prepared under the requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act and the Nuclear Waste Policy Amendments Act.

Transportation

Cask standards require being able to withstand a nine meter drop onto an unyielding surface, a puncture test involving a one-meter drop onto a 15-cm diameter pin; the outside surface to be heated to 1,475? F for 30 minutes, and immersion in water for eight hours.  There are different casks for truck and rail shipments.  Casks used for truck shipments have multi-layered walls to reduce the radiation exposure outside the cask, and to contain the radioactive material inside the cask.  Casks can weigh up to 23 metric tons and be about five meters long.  Most of this bulk is comprised of shielding materials.  Casks for rail cars are seven times larger than they are for trucks. Rail car casks have layered walls up to 28 cm thick, and can weigh as much as 90 metric tons.  In 1988, Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management (OCRWM) awarded five contracts to develop high capacity casks. These included casks for rail or barge shipment and casks for shipment by legal weight trucks.  The rail/barge cask would be designed for reactor sites that could handle a 90 metric ton load.  The legal weight truck casks would accommodate the remaining reactors, by staying within the 35 metric ton limit for total payload (vehicle and cargo), these cask systems would be considered legal weight trucks and would avoid the need for special permits.  In 1991, OCRWM decided to concentrate on two cask systems a 90 metric ton rail/barge cask designed by Babcock & Wilcox and legal weight truck casks designed by General Atomics.  In early 1994, OCRWM canceled work on the 90 metric ton rail/barge cask and focused its efforts on the multipurpose canister (MPC) system and the General Atomics legal weight truck casks.

OCRWM is considering the use of MPC's.  These strong metal containers would be loaded with spent fuel, sealed, and then placed inside separate casks for storage, shipment, and disposal (see figure 5 and 6).  Once sealed, the canisters would not be reopened.

Because they would remain sealed, the canisters would reduce the handling of separate fuel assemblies. Also, because OCRWM would make them available to all nuclear utilities, the canisters should help standardize the Nation's approach to managing spent fuel.  An MPC, placed inside a storage cask, could be used for storage either at the utility's site or at a federal storage facility.  MPC's are being designed to contain spent fuel from the two most common types of commercial reactors, boiling water and pressurized water reactors.  Each type will come in two sizes 110 metric tons and 65 metric tons.  The weight includes the canister, spent fuel, and transportation cask.  The main reason for using such large canisters is to put as much spent fuel as practical into one container, thus reducing the number of shipments and the statistical chances for transportation accidents.  The weight of the loaded canisters makes truck shipment impractical.  OCRWM plans to ship them by rail.  Because of a lack of rail access, crane capacity, or other limitations, some plants cannot handle either size canister, 65 or 110 metric tons. In a study reviewed by the Edison Electric Institute, OCRWM's management and operating contractor found that 88 facilities could handle both sizes, 14 facilities could handle the small but not the large size, and 19 facilities might not be able to handle either size.  One option for plants without rail access is to transport the loaded canisters by barge or heavy-haul truck to the nearest railhead.  Another option is to use legal-weight truck casks.  In mid 1994, OCRWM's management and operating contractor requested proposals for an MPC system. This procurement will proceed in phases to allow time for OCRWM to assess its options before proceeding further.

Three phases are planned for this procurement:
 

Choices of shipping routes affect both the cost and the risk of transporting radioactive waste.  Although OCRWM will seek comments on routing policy, the criteria for highway routing must comply with DOT regulations for shipping spent nuclear fuel and high level waste.  The transportation regulations require OCRWM to use preferred routes.  Preferred routes consist of interstate highways, bypasses where available, and alternative routes designated by state routing agencies.  Indian tribal authorities with the power to regulate highway routing and enforce those rules are considered to be state routing agencies.  In designating alternatives, the state routing agency must use DOT routing guidelines or an equivalent analysis of risks to public health.  The intent of these guidelines is to require carriers to use preferred routes that reduce time in transit.  DOT's Guidelines for Selecting Preferred Highway Routes for Highway Route Controlled Quantity Shipments of Radioactive Materials requires carriers to use a five step process for selecting routes:
 

There are three primary and four secondary factors for comparing routes.  The primary factors are radiation exposure from normal transportation, public health risk from transportation accidents, and economic risk from the accidental release of radioactive materials.  The secondary factors are emergency response effectiveness, evacuation capabilities, locations of such special facilities as hospitals and schools, and general traffic fatality and injury rates on the shipping route.  DOT regulations allow carriers to deviate from preferred routes only when:
 

The carrier must prepare a written route plan and provide copies to the driver, the shipper, and the NRC.  The NRC will file a copy with DOT.  The route plan must indicate the origin and destination of the shipment, the routes to be used, planned stops and estimated times of arrival and departure, and telephone numbers for emergency assistance within each state the truck will cross.  The Hazardous Materials Transportation Uniform Safety Act required DOT to conduct a spent fuel mode and route study to evaluate the effects of different modes and routes on public safety.  In December 1993, DOT completed its study and released a draft report entitled Identification of Factors for Selecting Modes and Routes for Shipping High Level Waste and Spent Nuclear Fuel.  DOT has received comments on this report and will submit a revised version to Congress.  The report identifies factors related to mode and route selection. It does not assign weights to these factors or give a specific formula for selecting modes and routes.  Instead, it describes several key factors and explains why they are important for evaluating risks.  These factors do not include economic impacts or public perceptions of risk:

General Population Exposed:

This factor is the public's potential radiation exposure during normal (incident free) operations.  It directly affects public safety, varies widely among alternatives, and is relatively easy to measure, with a strong reliance on census data.

Workers' potential radiation exposure during normal operations is an important factor.  It represents a large portion of the total incident free exposure.  It, too, can vary among alternatives and is relatively easy to measure.

This factor directly affects the risk of an accident or incident.  It also can vary among alternatives and is easily measured.

This information is needed to estimate the risk of either a radiological or a non-radiological accident.  Historical data are generally readily available, although their quality can vary.

Trip length affects all three aspects of public safety:  radiation exposure during normal conditions, the risk of vehicle accidents, and the risk of accidental release of radioactive materials.  Trip length is easy to measure and can vary substantially among different mode and route options.

The presence of environmentally sensitive areas along shipping routes can be an important factor.  It would be difficult to apply this factor in an objective, quantitative way when choosing among alternatives.

The ability to respond quickly and effectively to emergencies is important for mitigating the consequences of an accident.  The value of this factor, however, depends on whether reasonable units of measure can be established.

Cargo size and number of shipments affect routine exposure and the risk of radiological or non-radiological accidents.  This factor is both easy to measure and highly variable among mode and route options.  Given a certain amount of material, larger payloads mean fewer shipments and a reduced risk of transportation or handling accidents.  This factor tends to favor rail or barge shipments.

By the end of 1994, DOE had completed the first three steps.  The Department still must decide whether to include barge and inter modal routing in this guidance document.

With OCRWM's decision to consider MPC's, the issue of rail routing has increased in importance.  The Hazardous Materials Transportation Act authorizes DOT to regulate routing for any mode of transportation.  But so far DOT has not issued regulations or guidelines for selecting rail routes.  Part of the reason may be that railroads lie within private rights of way, which are outside the regulatory authority of lower levels of government.  In the absence of Federal regulation, rail companies have developed their own rules for selecting routes.  OCRWM has not yet established criteria for selecting rail routes.  These criteria will be part of the routing policy discussed under Highway Routing.  In August 1988, the director of the Transportation Management Division issued an informal set of criteria for selecting rail routes.

They were:
 

The Association of American Railroads has taken these positions on rail routing:
 

The Hazardous Materials Transportation Uniform Safety Act requires DOT to conduct a dedicated train study to analyze the safety implications of using dedicated trains as opposed to regular freight service.  When completed, this study and the mode and route study discussed under Highway Routing could provide information needed for rail routing criteria.  The Federal Government currently does not regulate the routing of hazardous shipments by barge.  In some ways, barge transportation is like both highway and rail transportation.  Just as trucks travel on publicly maintained highways, barges generally travel on publicly maintained waterways.  Routing criteria for barges will require consultation with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and U.S. Coast Guard.  During 1993 94, there were 33 shipments of slightly used nuclear fuel from the Shoreham plant on Long Island, NY, to the Limerick plant in Pennsylvania.  Each shipment was inter modal: heavy haul truck to barge, barge to rail, rail to Limerick.  The courts denied a New Jersey request for an injunction against shipments near its coast.  OCRWM expects barge transport to be limited to inter modal shipments from reactor sites without rail access.  Barges or heavy haul trucks, or a combination of the two, could carry spent fuel to the nearest railhead for shipment to a storage facility or repository.

Supervision

The repository will be monitored and maintained between the time the last waste package is placed and the time the repository is permanently closed.  Permanently installed sensors will be used to monitor waste packages, drifts and the surrounding rock, and to provide the data required by the performance confirmation activity. Robots will be used as required to investigate conditions in the emplacement drifts.  This will eliminate risk to workers from heat and radiation coming from the waste packages.  Specific facilities and equipment will be maintained to support the performance confirmation activities.  Facilities and equipment needed to respond to emergencies and treat low-level waste will also be maintained.  Some activities can also be performed to protect a cost-effective retrieval option.  Planning and preparation will be conducted in anticipation of closing the repository.  Decontamination and decommissioning of surface facilities, during closure operations, the surface facilities, including contaminated components, will be dismantled and decontaminated as necessary to restore the site to near its pre-repository condition.  The surface facilities will be designed to include features that will facilitate final decontamination and dismantling operations.  The waste treatment building will serve to support the decontamination and decommissioning activities by providing solid and liquid low-level radioactive waste treatment and packaging for transport to a low-level waste disposal site.  Hazardous and mixed wastes, if generated, will be collected and packaged for transport to off-site licensed facilities for treatment and disposal.

As part of the closure activities, detailed records and information on the repository will be distributed to government offices at the local, state and national level.  These levels of government will use this information and legal means, such as laws, permits and zoning, to control access to the site, thus creating institutional barriers.  Fences and warning signs will be maintained and modified as required.  Permanent monuments may also be put in place.  There are two opinions regarding permanent monuments.  The first argument is that, after the institutional barriers have stopped functioning, a monument will serve to identify the location where something of value is buried, thus inviting excavation and the release of radioactive material. The other argument is that a properly designed monument will warn future generations away from the site long after the institutional barriers have disappeared.  A preliminary study investigated the concept of using a central marker (pyramid) supplemented by perimeter markers.  The study has not yet been completed and no recommendation has been provided at this time.  A central marker could include a radiation hazard symbol on each of its sides, and a down-pointing arrow.  The perimeter markers could have the same hazard symbol and an arrow pointing to the central marker.

During the first few thousand years after closure, heat released from the waste together with naturally low water movement within the rock will limit the moisture in the emplacement drift so that waste packages are protected from corrosion.  During this time, some of the hazardous radioactive material will decay to very low levels.  After most of the heat has dissipated, water could return and contact the waste packages.  If corrosion of the waste package finally allows water to contact the enclosed waste material, it is expected to be in very small quantities which will limit how much radioactive material could be picked up and removed from the waste package.  Other means to limit the water that could contact waste packages for even longer time periods (up to 50,000 years) are being evaluated.  For example, drip shields could be placed over the waste packages or backfill could be added to the emplacement drifts.  Backfill could also be designed to retard the movement of radioactive material into the underlying rock.  More than 200 m of unsaturated rock separate the repository and the water table.  Given the small quantities of water expected to contact the waste and the long distances that must be traveled, only a very small amount of the very long-lived radioactive material could ever be present in quantities that could be of concern.  If these small quantities of radioactive material were to enter the saturated zone, where much larger volumes of water are slowly moving to the southeast from Yucca Mountain, it is very unlikely that any environmental health hazard would be produced.  The amount of radiation that could occur at an inhabited location would be comparable to or less than the background radiation that naturally occurs.

Nevada and Yucca Mountain Social Issues

Impact and “Special Effects”

This overall conclusion of the research to date suggests that Nevada faces considerable exposure with respect to such risk-induced effects.  Given the uncertainties associated with how the repository program and its consequences will be perceived, and about the way in which people will react to repository-related accidents and occurrences, the State must be alert to the possibility that these effects could be very negative and very large.  The actual size of these potential negative effects has not been determined yet, and the subject remains under study.  However, the study concluded that each one-percent decline for Clark County in spending by visitors, retired people, and investors relative to the baseline levels assumed to occur in some future year (e.g., 2010) could produce an annual loss of 7,000 jobs and $200 million in income.  It is not clear how large a percentage decline could be expected as a result of repository-related perceptions, nor how long it would last, but corresponding cases involving risk-related declines in tourist spending indicate that such decline could be well in excess of the conservative one-percent illustrated here.  Further research into analogous cases is planned to test these assumptions.

"Standard" Effects

These "standard effects" associated with additional repository-related population growth could, therefore, generate negative fiscal impacts for state and local jurisdictions.  Although such negative fiscal impacts would result for any non-gaming industry economic development, there is a distinction between the state's willingness to subsidize desired economic diversification and its willingness to subsidize the fiscal effects of a repository.  The goal of economic diversification programs in Nevada is to reduce the risk of economic losses in the event of a down turn in the state's all-important tourism industry.  A repository could enhance the risk to this very industry because of its stigmatizing potential.  Thus, the repository is generally not considered attractive from an economic development standpoint because it has the potential to bring about precisely the opposite effects on the economy as other forms of development.

One way to examine the potential economic effects of a project such as the Yucca Mountain repository is to compare project benefits such as jobs and revenue with potential losses.  Since it is extraordinarily difficult to do such an analysis with respect to the entire economy of southern Nevada, one way of assessing relative magnitudes is to compare the repository in economic terms with a representative economic initiative that could be at risk if negative impacts do occur.  To do this, the Nevada Agency for Nuclear Projects undertook an analysis comparing the repository as a generator of jobs and revenue with a single large hotel/casino project in the Las Vegas area.  Since the visitor/gaming sector of the state's economy has been identified as being at risk through previous state studies, the question was posed, "What would be the effects on the state's economy if, as a result of the repository, one large hotel/casino project were canceled or chose not to locate in Las Vegas?"  A second question and one that allows a measure of comparison is, "What are the costs of losing such a project compared with the jobs and revenue associated with the proposed Yucca Mountain repository?"  The analysis showed that, should the repository project cause just one such hotel/casino not to locate in Nevada in the future, the immediate impacts to southern Nevada could be upwards of 14,200 jobs and almost $500 million in revenue lost to the local economy annually.

Public Perceptions and Specific Issues and Concerns

Despite compelling evidence that Nevada is vulnerable to a variety of significant impacts as a result of the proposed Yucca Mountain repository and related nuclear waste transportation, the U.S. Department of Energy's approach to socioeconomic analysis and monitoring has been superficial and inadequate.  To date, DOE has not developed an adequate description of the repository project, including workforce and materials requirements, project revenues, operational characteristics, waste emplacement approaches or even waste volumes and types, transportation modes and routes, and other elements required for carrying out impact identification and assessment activities.  The mechanisms by which risk and stigma operate to cause negative economic and other effects are not well understood.  More work is needed to examine how Nevada's unique tourism based economy might be affected in the event of a nuclear waste accident.  To date, DOE has done no work in this area and, if fact, has invested considerable resources attempting to discredit Nevada's risk perception and stigma research.

The context within which impacts occur is important in determining the nature and severity of those impacts.  In an atmosphere of opposition and distrust, as currently exists in Nevada with regard to the repository program, even relatively minor events and accidents can be magnified and have significant effects on the socioeconomic fabric of communities and the State.  Rural communities near the Yucca Mountain site and along potential waste transportation routes may be especially vulnerable to disruptions from the project.  An influx of workers could overwhelm public services in small communities and cause significant changes in the quality of life, even in the absence of stigmatizing events.  DOE has done little to date to assess impacts on small communities or to develop plans to mitigate such impacts.  Native American communities stand to be affected by the repository program in ways different from, and perhaps more significantly than, non-Indian communities in the State.

The repository project has the potential to impact and generate conflict within the State that can have far-reaching implications.  The greatest potential socioeconomic threat from the proposed repository stems from the intense negative imagery associated by the public with a high-level radioactive waste repository, combined with the vulnerability of the Nevada economy to changes in its public image.  Because of the high profile nature of the whole nuclear waste disposal program, the potential exists for Nevada to become associated with this negative imagery to the detriment of its attempts to attract tourists, conventions, migrants and diversified new industry to the state.  From the evidence now available, it appears that the designation of Yucca Mountain as a repository site has already had significant impacts on Nevada, and that, depending upon numerous decisions not yet made by federal, state, and local agencies as well as public reactions to future events, the development of a repository could have a profound effect upon the economy and quality of life of the region.

Financing Waste Management

Costs of nuclear waste management can be estimated with a reasonable degree of confidence on the basis of the detailed technical plans worked out, even for facilities to be commissioned a considerable time in the future.  Contingency allowances are added to the basic estimates in order to ensure the adequacy of the final estimates.  Past experience of the costs of structures and systems at existing nuclear waste management facilities, or of other comparable facilities can be used in estimating future costs.  For estimating the costs of encapsulating plants, cost data for similar activities at nuclear power plants and interim storage facilities are appropriate.  Experience of constructing final repositories in rock for low and intermediate level radioactive waste, and of constructing other rock caverns, for example for mines or for oil reservoirs, gives a basis for evaluating the reliability of cost estimates of used fuel or high level waste repositories.

A few international examples of non-discounted cost estimates of nuclear waste management follow.  In Germany, it is planned to use the Gorleben repository for disposal of all types of waste, but especially high level wastes.  Low level wastes with small enough heat output to have a negligible thermal impact on the host rock formation will be placed in the Konrad repository.  The cost estimate, based on waste from 4000 TWh (Terra x1012) electricity production for construction of two repositories are $2.5 billion US, and for annual operation is $90 million.  The costs of construction and operation of these repositories account for about 1 mill/kWh of nuclear electricity.  In Finland, a cost estimate has been worked out for the total waste management system corresponding to production of 430 TWh (Terra x1012) (two power plants at Olkiluoto Finland).  The costs, including used fuel management, disposal of low and intermediate level wastes, decommissioning and final disposal of the decommissioning wastes as well as research and development work are $1.6 billion US, or about 4 mills/kWh.

In most countries, cost estimates for decommissioning a 1000 MW LWR are between $100 - $200 million US.  The costs of decommissioning and disposal of subsequent decommissioning wastes typically account for about 0.5 mill/kWh of the cost of electricity.  It is necessary to make financial provisions in advance, as a significant part of the waste management costs will arise after the power plants to which they relate have finished operation.  Systematic financial provisions have been made in most countries, in many cases by setting up state controlled funds, and collecting the finance necessary for fully providing for the costs of future waste management in the price of electricity during electricity production.
 

Program funding will be available from a variety of resources to safely manage nuclear waste.  The Nuclear Waste Policy Act directed that the civilian portion of the radioactive waste management program be funded by the generators and owners of nuclear generated electricity through a fee on the commercial generation of nuclear power.  This fee, which is assessed at 1 mil per kilowatt hour (0.1 cents/kwh), is deposited into the Nuclear Waste Fund to be used for waste management.  The waste management is in direct competition with all other programs for the limited funding available each year.  A separate Defense Nuclear Waste Disposal appropriation was established as part of the fiscal year 1993 Energy and Water Development Appropriation to cover the cost of the disposal of defense high level radioactive waste in the repository, through which the government makes payments into the Nuclear Waste Fund.  The NRC has two funds available until expended.  The first one is for agency salaries and expenses, and the other is for the Office of the Inspector General.  The total budget for fiscal 1995 was $621.6 million.  The NRC will obtain funding through, permits, licensing and inspection fees required for power plants to operate safely.

Most of the funding will come from fiscal policies created by the government.  Additional funding will be available from the private sector in the form of research and development from firms who will benefit from the geologic repository.  Programs that are not used for program expenditures are invested in U.S. Treasury securities.  Payments by utilities currently total around $600 million per year, entirely from the 1 mil per kilowatt hour fee.  An important income generator will be from other nations who will require nuclear waste storage and companies who have been targeted as inappropriately disposing of hazardous waste and are fined by the NRC.

Conclusion

Facts which should be known about radioactive wastes and their management:
 

Radioactive wastes can be safely and economically dealt with by a variety of known methods all of which fulfill the same broad principles.  There is international consensus on these principles, whose goal is to ensure that all radioactive wastes are managed so that human health and the environment are protected now and in the future without placing an unacceptable burden on later generations.  The crucial problem is public confidence.  There has been a failure to communicate that adequate ways are known of managing radioactive wastes with responsibility towards the present and future generations at reasonable cost.  Broad knowledge exists on methods that will achieve these objectives, and on the scale of their costs.  Short lived waste, which forms the bulk of all the waste, is already taken care of on an industrial scale.  Facilities for final disposal of the very small quantity of high level long-lived radioactive waste have not been urgently required, because initial storage minimizes the total radiation exposures from all management of this wastes, including final disposal.  However, taking into account the length of time needed to completion of construction of final repositories, the time has now come to start.  What is needed is for the industry to earn the confidence of the public and for governments to support the steps necessary for this start to be made.  The technological knowledge to build and operate the facilities and estimate their costs exists.  They can be built and managed at reasonable cost in relation to the cost of other methods of generating electricity.

The concept for operating a geologic repository meets the requirements established by the NRC and strives for safety, efficiency and flexibility.  The team of scientists and engineers at the Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management has developed a sound conceptual design for operating a geologic repository to dispose of the nation's spent nuclear fuel and high-level nuclear waste.  This concept for the repository design and operation meets all applicable laws and regulations.  The design process will continue to provide more details and continue to answer more questions about the expected performance of the repository.  The health and safety of the workers are considered at every step of the development process.  Alternate designs and approaches to operating the repository will be evaluated to ensure the most efficient solutions are implemented.  Flexibility is built into the concepts to provide contingencies against uncertainties and unpredictable events.  We can no longer have a wait and see attitude.  Our world is changing everyday, and we need to keep up with the changes.  There are those of us who would rather spend money and resources on other issues.  The fact of the matter is we can no longer go on pretending that it will go away. Yes!  There are probably better ideas, than the geologic repository type, but until those individuals or organizations can prove that it is better and economically more feasible, only then will there voices be heard.  This is a monumental task that needs to be addressed now, and not 10 years later.  Most if not all of the nuclear reactor sites are quickly running out of pool and above ground storage.  Is it dangerous? Yes!  Will it solve our nuclear problem? No!  We all need to pull together both resources and ideas to make this a better planet to live on, and the most effective way of doing this, is to become educated and well informed.  We here at GRB can only hope that this document has provided some insight, concerning nuclear waste issues that are addressed and properly dealt with.  With proper knowledge and best available technology, our world problems can be solved in a safe and timely manner, providing  the future generation with a clean and healthy planet to live on.

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